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In this chapter, we describe the potential significance of student peer effects for the economic
structure of and behavior in higher education. Their existence would motivate much of the restricted
supply, student queuing, and selectivity  n and institutional competition via merit aid and honors
colleges  n that we see in American higher education; their (appropriate) non-linearity could justify
the resulting stratification of higher education as an efficient way to produce human capital. In
addition, we use data from the College and Beyond entering class of 1989, combined with
phonebook data identifying roommates, to implement a quasi-experimental empirical strategy aimed
at measuring peer effects in academic outcomes. In particular, we use data on individual students’
grades, SAT scores, and the SAT scores of their roommates at three schools to estimate the effect
of roommates' academic characteristics on an individual's grades. The results suggest that, for two
of the three schools used, students in the middle of the SAT distribution do somewhat worse in terms
of grades if they share a room with a student who is in the bottom 15 percent of the SAT
distribution. Students in the top of the SAT distribution appear often not to be affected by the SAT
scores of their roommates. These results are similar to those reported in earlier research using data
from Williams (Zimmerman) and Dartmouth (Sacerdote).
Gordon C. Williams David J. Zimmerman
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Williams College Williams College 





  Peer effects have played an important analytical and empirical role in studies of 
primary and secondary education since the Coleman Report in 1966 
1 -- they have been 
used to justify busing and have entered the debates on educational costs, on tracking, and 
on the effects of voucher systems.
2   But they have been seen as relevant to the economics 
of higher education only recently
3 and with only a small, if growing, empirical 
component.
4   
 
  This chapter will address three questions: Why should we care about peer effects 
in examining the economics of colleges and universities?  What do we know about them?  
And what are we learning?   
II.  Peer Effects in the Economics of Higher Education 
  A.  What Are Peer Effects? 
 
To begin at the beginning: Peer effects exist when a person’s behavior is affected 
by his or her interaction with one or more other people.  And those people have to be 
                                                 
1 (Coleman, Campbell et al. 1966) 
2 (U.S. Supreme Court 1971; Summers and Wolfe 1977; Hanushek 1986; Robertson and Symons 1996; 
Epple and Romano 1998; Lazear 1999; Hoxby 2000). 
3 (Rothschild and White 1995; Winston 1995, 1999; Epple, Romano et al. 2001) 
4  (Zimmerman 1999; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2000; Goethals 2001; Sacerdote 2001).    3




  Peer quality is often included as an argument in an educational production 
function, but it’s useful to put the matter even more directly as an interaction between 
two students,  
 
  (1)  B1 = f(B2, C2, X) 
  
where Bi is behavior, Ci is characteristics for students i = 1, 2 and X is a vector of other 
things relevant to 1’s behavior.   
 
  Then peer effects exist if the partial derivatives aren’t zero and they are 
asymmetric or “non-linear” if those partials differ at different levels of B and C.  The 
main empirical problem with studying peer effects, of course, is selection; that people 
usually choose their peers so similarities in behavior may be the result of peer effects – 
influence – or simply selection – choice. 
 
B. Why Do We Care? 
 
Peer effects impact the economics of higher education in three ways:   
 
                                                 
5 Peer effects among faculty (and administrators) can be important, too, of course, to recruiting, teaching, 
and scholarly productivity, but they are not the issue here.  (Rosovsky 1990; Kennedy 1997)     4
1.  They eliminate some large and awkward anomalies in the economic behavior of 
colleges and universities and the economic structure of higher education as an 
industry, if peer effects exist. 
2.  They might justify as economically efficient the observed segmentation of student 
quality and resources – the institutional disparities we observe in American higher 
education – if peer effects are appropriately non-linear. 
3.  They lead to trade in peer quality in a market inextricably linked – blended – with 
that for educational services.  Both of those markets and their interaction are 




  In the chapter, we focus on the first of these as most basic – the existence of peer 
effects, per se.  We will examine the second – efficiency and the asymmetries in peer 
effects – but express our frustration because, while they are potentially important, the 
empirical evidence so far gives only hints about their nature.  And we’ll do little more 
than note the third – the blended markets for educational services and peer quality – since 
its discussion would require a chapter to itself (but see Winston, 2003). 
 
III.  Peer Effects and Anomalies In the Higher Education Industry 
 A.  Anomalies 
At first blush, higher education looks much like a normal industry that makes a 
product (educational services) using purchased inputs (faculty labor, heating oil, etc…) 
that it sells to customers (students) for a price (tuition) in a quite competitive market.  But  
                                                 
6 (Rothschild and White 1995; Winston 2002)    5
 
•  Colleges charge a price that fails – significantly – to cover their production costs; 
•  They turn away a majority of potential customers who are willing and able to buy 
their product, if they can;  
•  they don’t expand output to meet persistent excess demand, if they can avoid it;  
•  They lower price to attract one customer, replacing another who’d pay a higher 
price;  
•  They judge institutional quality by how many customers they can turn away and 
they may manipulate sales-admission policies to increase that number;
7  
•  They require elaborate application procedures before one is allowed to make a 
purchase;                 
•  They often make their customers live together, maximizing their contacts;    
•  They practice extensive price discrimination, not always to increase sales 
revenues but often to redistribute income among their customers; 
•  And so on.  
 
  So colleges and universities don’t fit a familiar industry model – and a bad 
analogy can create bad policy (as it has recently, for instance, with the Justice 
Department and Congressional Cost Commission
8). 
 
B.  Economic Characteristics 
 
                                                 
7 On early decision, see (Avery, Fairbanks et al. 2001; Fallows 2001). 
8 (US Court of Appeals 1993; National Commission on the Cost of Higher Education 1998)     6
  But those anomalies disappear and higher education becomes an economically 
coherent industry if, in fact, four economic characteristics are typical of colleges, 
universities, and higher education: 
 




  2 – If those donated resources are very unevenly distributed, supporting a 
hierarchy of schools based on their independence from sales revenues, 
 
  3 – If colleges and universities are less interested in profits than in a ‘mission’ and 
in ‘achieving excellence or prestige,’ and 
 
  4 – If, in higher education, students provide an input critical to its production – if 
peer effects are important to educational output.   
 
  So if these characteristics exist in higher education, they save the day – though 
they do call for very different economic analysis and policies.
10 
 
C. Evidence of Those Characteristics 
 
  What is the evidence? 
                                                 
9 (Hansmann 1980).   
10 See (Winston 1999)    7
  No. 1 - Donations - Non-Commercial Resources 
  Certainly the first is now well established – colleges and universities charge prices 
that are less, a lot less, than the costs of production.  A great deal of time has been spent 
with data from individual schools and collectively, with national (IPEDS) data for more 
than 2,800 colleges and universities to establish the facts in Table 1.   
 
  The top line describes average data over all American colleges and universities in 
both public and private sectors in 1995-6, showing that overall, tuition (sales) revenues 
support only a small part of the cost of producing a student’s education, the rest is 
covered by donations (past and present, public and private).  The price/cost ratio averages 
0.32, overall, and ranges from a 0.13 average in the public sector to a 0.45 average 
among private schools.  In a more complete analysis of IPEDS data that recognized 
collegiate saving, too, it appears that in a typical year, 75% of the economic resources 




  No. 2 - The Uneven Distribution of Donations 
  The bottom part of Table 1 addresses the second characteristic, indicating how 
very unevenly those donations, and hence the student subsidies they support, are 
distributed among schools.  The average student at a school in the top decile got a 
subsidy of  $21,000  a year – by paying $6,063 for a $27,054 education – while a typical 
                                                 
11 (Winston, Carbone et al. 2001).    8
student in a bottom decile school got only $1,700 – paying $6,348 for a $8,084 education.  
And decile data hide significant variation within the tails of the distribution.
12 
 
  No. 3 - A Non-profit Objective  Function 
  Though it retains its central microanalytic role, the third economic characteristic –
institutional values or objective function – can’t be supported by data, of course.  The 
existence, however, of decidedly non-profit behavior like need-blind admissions with 
need-based financial aid, along with policies like Berea College’s zero tuition combined 
with its family income cap, certainly seem strongly to imply it.  And economists – 
Hansmann, James, Clotfelter,
13 etc… -- have typically specified the objective function for 
a college in terms of excellence (or prestige) and mission. 
 
IV.  The Existence of Peer Effects 
  The fourth characteristic is central to this chapter – if peer effects exist, they 
describe the incentive that schools have that leads to the stratification of students and the 
resulting concentration of student quality in those schools with the most non-commercial, 
donative resources (per student).  Stratification, if peer effects exist, is the result of an 
efficiency wage
14 in the form of student subsidy that’s paid to generate a queue of 
applicants for a school from whom the best, in terms of the peer quality input they bring, 
are being selected.   All schools may value the educational quality that is improved 
through peer effects provided by good students, but peer quality is scarce and those 
                                                 
12 In the bottom decile are for-profit schools whose student subsidies are negative; in the top decile are 
those like Williams where an education that costs roughly $75,000 to produce is sold for a sticker price of 
$32,470, an average net price of $24,000 and therefore a subsidy of about $51,000 a year. 
13 (James 1978; Hansmann 1980; Clotfelter 1996). 
14 (Akerlof and Yellen 1986)    9
schools that are able to pay the most for it get the most of it.  The uneven distribution of 
those non-commercial resources creates a hierarchy that supports the stratification of 
student quality and motivates the long run supply restrictions on which that selectivity 
rests.  So the existence of peer effects – in a world of uneven non-commercial revenues 
and institutional devotion to “excellence” – would produce the industry structure we see. 
 
  Other things, though, might motivate the same sort of highly selective structure – 
filtering or signaling, students (or parents) getting enhanced personal utility from 
selection and exclusivity, per se, the satisfactions of association with the rich and famous, 
a marketing strategy in which schools want to emphasize that “those who have choices 
chose us,” a self-reinforcing seeking of prestige
15 – but while such a list of possibilities 
can be constructed, none of them implausible in itself, they are not only unsatisfyingly ad 
hoc, but they produce no socially useful outcome
16 while peer effects, by enhancing 
learning, can increase the production of human capital.
17   
 
  On the other hand, there are some familiar production externalities of student 
quality, aside from the peer interactions on which we’re concentrating – like an 
instructor’s ability to assign more advanced readings to better students, to give more 
intense and efficient lectures or to have more productive seminars – that are often thought 
                                                 
15 (Arrow 1973; Basu 1989; James 1990; Becker 1991; Clotfelter 1996) 
16 Arrow is explicit: “Higher education, in this [filtering] model, contributes in no way to superior 
economic performance; it increases neither cognition nor socialization.  Instead, higher education serves as 
a screening device, in that it sorts out individuals of differing abilities, thereby conveying information to 
the purchaser of labor… But even if (it) does have a positive informational value, it by no means follows 
that it is socially worthwhile" (p.199). 
17Peer effects, what’s more, may explain some of the educational technologies observed in higher 
education like residential colleges or organized study groups that increase peer interactions and hence 
performance.  (Alexander, Gur et al. 1974; Fraser, Beamn et al. 1977)    10
of as “peer effects” and will have the same sort of effect of making educational 
production a function of student quality and hence of motivating segmentation as 
efficient.  Though they may have much the same effects, however, these externalities 
escape measurement when we ask, “Do peer effects exist?” 
 
V.  Efficiency and the Asymmetry of Peer Effects 
  So if peer effects exist, they can explain the segmented structure of higher 
education as the result of schools’ bidding for peer quality inputs, the wealthy with more 
success than others.  But, as Hoxby noted,
18 the existence, per se, of peer effects may 
leave any regrouping of students as a largely distributional matter.  Resorting students – 
altering the stratification in higher education – would create winners and losers in the 
same measure under strictly linear or symmetric peer effects.  But if peer effects are non-
linear – asymmetric – so students at different levels of behavior or characteristics are 
influenced differently by their interaction with others, then peer effects introduce an issue 
of economic efficiency, too.  How students are grouped will affect the total amount of 
learning produced from given resources. 
 
  If weak students gain more from proximity to strong peers than the strong 
students lose from that association, then overall learning would be increased by reducing 
stratification – a point made a few years ago by McPherson and Schapiro in suggesting 
random assignment of students to colleges.
19   But if asymmetries in peer effects run the 
other way so that strong students interacting with other strong students are also more 
                                                 
18 (Hoxby 2000) 
19 (McPherson and Schapiro 1990)    11
sensitive to peer influence – gaining more in learning than would weak students in those 
same circumstances – then stratification and segmentation could increase, not decrease, 
aggregate learning.  In the extreme, stratification would be supported on grounds of 
efficiency if strong students were sensitive to peer quality at all levels while weak 
students were unaffected by peers at any level. 
 
    Yet framing the issue as one of “strong students” and “weak students” – while it 
fits the empirical work that’s been possible so far – misses a potentially important 
question of peer “distance” – how far apart the peers are in their behavior and 
characteristics.  Is their interaction a nudge or a bludgeon?   Are peer responses very 
different (asymmetric) outside of a “neighborhood” of proximity so a slightly different 
peer is influential but someone very different is not?
20  It’s certainly a question at the 
center of stratification – a strong student might typically inspire somewhat weaker peers 
while intimidating those more distant from her abilities.  For the strong student, 
moderately weaker peers might represent a challenge and a chance to learn-by-teaching 
while much weaker peers would simply overwhelm.  And numbers would play a role not 
captured in either our framing or our evidence – given differences and distances among 
peers, a student would likely respond differently to one such peer than to a whole school 
of them.  So the shape of nonlinearities in peer effect responses would depend on both 
peer distance and numbers. 
 
                                                 
20 This, of course, is in keeping with the Manski-Wise observation that students “… preferred to enroll in 
colleges where the average academic ability of the enrolled students was slightly higher than their own.  
Schools where the average SAT scores of entering freshmen were either too low or too high were relatively 
disfavored.” (Manski and Wise 1983 )       12
  Finally, whatever the efficiency or inefficiency of existing stratification in 
producing aggregate learning, it would have to address the question recently raised with 
some force by Nicholas Lemann about whether those high-ability students, after learning 
more from their expensive educations with strong and sensitive peers, use all that 
learning to do anything very useful for society – whether their social marginal product 
justifies that selectivity.
21  He argued that it doesn’t. 
 
VI.  The Evidence 
  A.  The Ideal Data 
 
  As a transition from description of the potentially central economic role we’ve 
suggested that student peer effects might play in higher education to description of the 
more modest empirical results we are able to report on next, and add to, it’s useful to 
describe the ideal data whose analysis would persuasively support that role.  Inevitably, 
of course, the actual evidence must fall far short of perfection, but it’s useful to see how 
and where. 
  
  Ideally, the empirical test of the existence and shape of peer effects in colleges 
would, in terms of equation (1) above, deal with: 
•  Student behavior, B1, that is centrally relevant to the purposes of higher 
education, broadly defined, to include, inter alia, the development of intellectual 
curiosity, persistence, acquisition of facts, humane values, aesthetic sensitivities, 
analytical and technical sophistication, social responsibility, etc. 
                                                 
21 (Lemann 1999, 1999)    13
•  His behavior, B1, and the characteristics and behavior of his peers, B2, and C2, 
that were unambiguously measureable in order to investigate not only the sign of 
peer differences and response but also their magnitudes, 
•  A large population of students that generated a good deal of variation in B1, B2, 
and C2, and their interaction, describing different distances between peers to 
reveal neighborhood asymmetries and non-linearities, 
•  Truly random assignment of associations between students that eliminated 
preferences in peer association, and 
•  Variations in peer characteristics of communities to reveal any social critical mass 
in conditioning peer interactions. 
 
  Data meeting these conditions would allow an effective test of the existence of 
peer effects and their non-linearities or asymmetries.  And they would eliminate 
misgivings about the importance to higher education of the peer behaviors and 
characteristics studied so far. 
 
  Inevitably, of course, the studies described in the rest of the chapter fall short of 
the ideal.  Though selection bias has largely been avoided through use of randomly 
assigned room mates and experimental groups and the results consistently show the 
existence of peer influences on behaviors that are relevant to education, it remains that in 
measuring a student’s GPA response (or test scores or retention or fraternity membership) 
to his room mate’s SATs (or income or fraternity membership), we’re looking at a fairly    14
thin slice of student behaviors and characteristics that leaves out a whole lot of what’s 
happening to shape higher education.   
 
  But we find optimism in that thinness.  If evidence of student peer effects can be 
found in so narrow a range of academic characteristics and behaviors, it’s hard not to 
believe that with a wider and more appropriate range, they would appear with a good deal 
more strength.  Indeed, in having to use such limited evidence for so broad an influence 
(and so sweeping a hypothesis), we didn’t initially expect peer effects to be significantly 
evident.  But we could neither conjure up more appropriate data nor convince ourselves 
that we could adequately account for selection effects in a more general population with 
broader behaviors.
22  We were trying to see if we could find an iceberg and feel confident 
that we’ve located the tip. 
 
  But clearly, it’s been easier to find evidence of the existence of peer effects than 
to learn much about their non-linearities.  So these results do more to support the idea 
that peer effects help to explain industry structure and selectivity in higher education – 
their positive role – than to support the more demanding idea that asymmetries in peer 
effects can justify that structure on efficiency grounds – their normative role. 
 
  B. What We Have Learned So Far 
In an earlier study, one of us (Zimmerman 1999) investigated peer effects 
associated with a student’s own grade point average and the academic strength (as 
measured by SAT scores) of  his peers.  That study attempted to overcome the selection 
                                                 
22 Making it very difficult to document peer effects within athletic teams, for instance (Shulman 2001).    15
bias issue by assembling a unique set of data comprised of twelve classes of students at 
Williams College containing information on their grades, major, gender, race, etc. along 
with information on where and with whom they were housed in their freshman year.
23  In 
that paper, Zimmerman argued that freshman housing at Williams closely resembled 
random assignment.  That being the case, it was meaningful to contrast students with 
high, medium, and low SAT scores who, by chance, had roommates with high, medium, 
or low SAT scores.  This allowed, for example, comparisons between the grades of low 
SAT students who roomed with other low SAT roommates to the grades of low SAT 
students who roomed with high SAT roommates.  Any differences in the outcomes could, 
because of the quasi-random assignment, be attributed to peer effects.  The basic findings 
of that effort suggested that students in the middle of the SAT distribution did somewhat 
worse in terms of grades if they shared a room with a student who was in the bottom 15 
percent of the verbal SAT distribution.  Interestingly, students in the top and the bottom 
of the SAT distribution were not affected by the SAT scores of their (room or entry) 
peers.  The effects, for the middle group, weren’t large, but were statistically significant 
in many models.   Furthermore, peer effects were almost always linked more strongly 
with verbal SAT scores than with math SAT scores.   
 
These results, however, were estimated in the context of a highly selective liberal arts 
college.  In that study, the “low” SAT students would, on average, still rank at about the 
85
th percentile of the national SAT score distribution.  The results could also have been 
idiosyncratic to Williams. 
                                                 
23  See (Zimmerman forthcoming).  This paper contains a broad overview of the academic literature 
considering peer effects    16
 
Recent research has given additional support to the claim that peer effects exist in 
higher education (c.f. Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2000; Goethals 2001; Sacerdote 
2001).   All of these studies have examined the influence the characteristics or behavior 
of one student has on the behavior of another.  The peer characteristics observed were, 
for the most part, variants on academic ability – SAT or ACT scores or more nuanced 
evaluations of academic promise generated in the admission process – while the 
influenced behavior was largely grades or performance on a written test.  These 
characteristics were broadened to include gender and income and behaviors were 
broadened to include dropout behavior, choice of major, and fraternity membership. 
 
Sacerdote (2001), using data from Dartmouth and also using a roommate-based 
strategy found evidence of a peer impact of a student on his roommate’s grade point 
average as well as on his participation in fraternities.  Sacerdote’s results suggest a non-
linear relationship with both weaker and stronger students performing better when their 
roommate was in the top 25% of the academic index distribution.   In addition, Sacerdote 
found evidence of peer effects in fraternity participation, but no evidence of peer effects 
in choice of college major.   
 
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2000) employed a dataset from Berea College.  
Like Zimmerman (1999) and Sacerdote (2001), they used the random assignment of 
roommates to identify the peer effect.  Berea College targets low-income students 
(capping family income at about $65,000) and so provides a useful complement to the    17
highly selective schools used in the other studies.  There, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 
found no evidence that either first semester grades or retention are associated with 
roommates’ ACT scores.  They did, however, find evidence that roommate income had a 
positive impact on both grades and retention, holding ACT scores constant, but only for 
women.  
 
Goethals (2000) employed a unique and innovative experimental framework to 
measure peer effects.  The study explored whether “students would perform better 
writing about newspaper articles they read and discussed in academically homogenous or 
heterogeneous groups of three.”  Interestingly, he found that students’ performance was 
not linked to their own academic rating but was affected by whether they were placed 
with academically homogenous or heterogeneous peers.  He found that groups composed 
of students who all had a low academic rating and groups composed of students who all 
had a high academic rating perform similarly – with both groups of these types out 
performing groups in which some students had high ratings and some low ratings.
24   
These results were stronger for men than women.  So he found that peers’ academic 
characteristics influenced others’ behavior but not with straightforward non-linearities.     
 
In sum, there is a growing – though still small – body of evidence suggesting that 
peer effects exist in higher education.  The evidence is not clear on the nature of any non-
linearities or interactions based on gender.  It also suggests that non-academic peer 
characteristics may also be important.   
                                                 
24 Should these results hold up on further study, they have clear implications for sorting, stratification, and 
hierarchy among colleges.    18
  
In this chapter we next add to the empirical evidence by employing data from the 
College and Beyond (C&B) database – created by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation -- 
along with matched housing data for three schools in the C&B data.  This allows us to 
apply the same empirical roommate-based approach to measuring peer effects described 
above. In so doing, this work adds additional evidence on the impact of peer 
characteristics in higher education. 
 
  VII.  Empirical Strategy:  New Evidence 
 
To estimate academic peer effects from the College and Beyond data in terms of 
equation (1) above, we follow the now traditional path of relating the cumulative grade 
point average of a student (B1) to his own SAT scores and to the SAT scores of his first 
year roommate (C2).  More formally, we estimate regression models specified as: 
 
(2)   GPA SAT SAT X ii i
RM
ii c =+ + + + αβ β β ε 12 3  
 
where GPA is the student’s Grade Point Average measured cumulatively to graduation,
25 
SAT is the student’s own SAT score (sometimes entered separately for math and verbal 
scores), SAT
RM  is the student’s freshman roommate’s SAT score (sometimes entered 
separately for math and verbal scores), and X is a vector of other characteristics (such as 
                                                 
25 Grade performance for the first year, alone, was not available in C&B data, but analysis of the Williams’ 
data where both cumulative and freshman year GPA could be used showed that they yielded the same 
results (Zimmerman 1999).    19
race, gender) of the student.
26  If students are randomly assigned their roommates, then 
the estimated peer effect (β 2) will be unbiased.  More generally, the estimate will be 
unbiased if it is plausible that the error term is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. 
  
  In addition, we estimate models that allow for non-linearities in the peer effect.  In 
particular, we allow the peer effect to vary based on whether the student or his roommate 
is in the lowest 15 percent, the middle 70 percent, or the top 15 percent of the SAT 
distribution.  Formally, we estimate: 
 
(3)  GPA SAT SAT X j ij i g ig
DRM
g
ii c =+ + + + =
= ∑ αβ β β ε 1
1
3
3 123 ;, ,  
where SATig
DRM  are dummy variables for each SAT score range (indexed by g) and β g is 
the peer effect associated with that range.   
 
 VIII.  Data 
 
The C&B data used in this study were created and made available to us by the 
Andrew Mellon foundation. The C&B data contain both institutional and survey data for 
over 90,000 students enrolled in thirty-four mostly-selective colleges and universities in 
the United States for the entering classes of 1951, 1976, and 1989.  The present study 
                                                 
26  An appealing alternative strategy would be to include the roommate’s GPA in the regression.  Such a 
variable might better measure actual rather than potential performance.  The problem with including such a 
variable is that it is simultaneously determined within the roommate context.  Using such a measure would 
introduce simultaneous equation bias.      20
uses data from three of the schools in the C&B population for the entering class of 1989 – 
for the graduating Class of ‘93.  Institutional data in College and Beyond provide 
information on the students’ grades, major, race, gender, etc.  These data were combined 
with housing information extracted from college phonebooks to form a unique data set 
that allowed us to identify college roommates.   
 
The schools selected for our sub-sample were chosen because a) they house their 
first year students together and b) the assignment mechanism of students to rooms (as 
indicated by their housing descriptions on the World Wide Web and conversations with 
their housing offices) is roughly random.  It was necessary to use schools that group first 
year students together because the C&B data do not provide information on other classes.  
If, for example, a school allowed first and second year students to live together we would 
have no information on the second year students, given C&B’s restriction to the three 
cohorts. Further, it is necessary for the allocation to be approximately random since 
selection bias can be serious when students are allowed to choose their roommates or if 
the housing office groups students in such a way that under- or over-performers are more 
likely to be housed together.  In this case, the requirement that the error term be 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables would be violated.  In Zimmerman’s earlier 
study of Williams freshmen (1999), he was able to utilize data from the housing 
application forms to conduct some relatively simple analyses to check whether the 
assumption of random assignment was plausible, and it was.
27  The schools in this sample 
employed a similar protocol to that used by Williams in using housing forms indicating 
                                                 
27  Similarly, estimates in Sacerdote (2001) were unaffected by the inclusion of housing preference 
variables.    21
sleep preferences, smoking behavior, etc. in assigning students to rooms/roommates – 
though the underlying housing form data were not obtained.
28   
 
IX.  Empirical Results 
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the sample.  The number of observations for 
the samples from the three schools ranged from 1,458 to 2,116.  SAT scores ranged from 
a low of 360 on the verbal test and 420 on the math test to a maximum of 800 on both 
tests.  The average combined SAT score ranged from 1344 to 1409.  These scores are 
high, putting the average student in the top 10 percent of the population of test takers.   
Each school had between 7% and 9% African American students and 2%-5% Hispanic 
students.   
 
Table 3 presents estimates of equation (2).  The results for each school are reported in 
a separate column where a student’s cumulative grade point average is regressed on his 
own SAT score (divided by 100), race, gender, major, and roommate’s SAT score.  The 
model includes controls for a student’s major (which is selected in his or her junior year) 
to provide some control for grade differentials arising from students’ taking different 
courses (Sabot 1991).   
 
                                                 
28 See (Zimmerman forthcoming) for a mathematical model that illustrates the possibility of bias in the 
estimated peer effects flowing from the use of housing forms in assigning students to rooms.  Chi-squared 
tests indicate that we cannot reject independence between the SAT scores of roommates  for schools #1 and 
#3 in the sample.  For school #2 independence is rejected.  The rejection is driven by a somewhat high 
fraction of low SAT students living together and a somewhat low fraction of low SAT students living with 
high SAT students.  The distribution of low, medium, and high students is as expected under independence 
for the middle SAT students.  In total, there are about 100 of the 2116 students that show signs of selection.      22
The effect of a student’s own SAT score is large and statistically significant, with 
each 100 point increase resulting in between a .116 and a .132 increase in grade point 
average.  After controlling for SAT scores, black and Hispanic students score between a 
quarter and a third of a grade point below white students.  Female students score between 
.082 and .127 grade points higher than male students.    Finally, roommate’s SAT score is 
found to have a positive and statistically significant effect only for School #2 – where a 
100 point increase in a student’s roommate’s combined SAT score translates into a .02 
increase in the student’s own grade point average.  This effect is about 17 percent as large 
as that of a 100 point increment in the student’s own SAT score.
29   
 
Tables 4, 6, and 8 report estimates of equation (3) allowing the peer effect to depend 
on the student’s own position in the SAT distribution.  Panel A allows us to see whether 
weak, average, or strong students (as measured by their SAT scores) are more, or less, 
affected by roommates.  The results in these panels suggest that strong students at all 
three schools are unaffected by the SAT scores of their roommates.  Students in the 
bottom 15% of the SAT distribution benefit from higher SAT scoring roommates at 
School #1 – though not at schools 2 and 3.  Students in the middle 70 percent of the 
distribution are unaffected by the SAT scores of their roommates at Schools 1 and 3 – 
though they benefit from higher scoring roommates at School #2.  Students in the middle 
70 percent of the SAT distribution at School #2 experience, on average, a .02 increase in 
their cumulative GPA when their roommates’ SAT scores increase by 100 points. 
 
                                                 
29 It is worth noting here that models allowing for differential effects for math and verbal SAT scores were 
also estimated, but standard F-tests indicated no measurable difference in their impact.  Accordingly, only 
models using combined SAT scores are reported.       23
Panel B allows the peer effect to be nonlinear.  That is, it allows us to see whether 
weak, average, or strong students (as measured by their SAT scores) are more, or less, 
affected by having roommates who are weak, average, or strong in terms of their 
combined SAT scores.  For this model, at School #1, we find low SAT students 
performing somewhat worse when roomed with a similarly weak peer.  The coefficient 
shows grades for this group would increase by .156 points if they had a high SAT room 
mate.  The coefficient is significant at the ten percent level.  At School #2, neither the 
strongest nor the weakest students are affected by the SAT scores of their roommates.  
Students in the middle 70% of the SAT distribution, however, perform somewhat worse 
when their roommates are in the bottom 15% of the SAT distribution.  The estimates 
suggest that a student in this part of the SAT distribution, with a bottom 15% roommate, 
would, on average, have a cumulative GPA that is lower by .086 points than that of a 
similar student whose roommate was in the top 15% of the SAT distribution.  Similar 
results are found at School #3 where, in addition, there is evidence that the strongest 
students perform better when their roommates are academically stronger. It is worth 
noting that these results are robust to moderate variations in the percentile cutoffs used to 
define the groups.   
 
Tables 5, 7, and 9 report estimates of equation (3) separately for men and women.  
Perhaps due to smaller sample sizes, peer effects are not statistically significant for most 
groups.  Exceptions are found at Schools #2 and #3.  At School #2, male students in the 
middle of the SAT distribution are found to perform worse when their roommate is in the    24
lowest 15% of the SAT distribution; at School #3, academically strong women perform 
better when given academically strong peers.   
 
Table 10 presents estimates using data stacked for the three schools.  School fixed 
effects are included in these models.  The main advantage of stacking the data is that 
there are larger cell sizes – giving us more precise estimates -- with which to gauge any 
non-linearities.  These results are presented pooled by gender and also separately for male 
and female students.  The results mirror those above with students in the middle showing 
lower grades if their roommate is in the bottom 15% of the SAT distribution.  The 
estimates suggest that this result is driven by the male sample – as the coefficients for 
women are not significant for any of the SAT groups.  There is also some evidence – 
again particularly for men – that strong students perform somewhat worse if their 
roommate is in the middle of the SAT distribution rather than in the top. 
  
To put the myriad results in context it is useful to summarize the existing research 
more succinctly.  The research to date, including the evidence reported in this paper, on 
the effect of peer academic characteristics on a “grade type” outcome, is summarized in 
the Table 11.  
 
These studies differ in a variety of ways:  the selectivity of the school surveyed, the 
measurement and detection of non-linearities, the outcome considered, the existence of 
differences by gender, and so on.  The evidence found thus far suggests that the existence 
of peer effects at the most basic level has been confirmed in each of the studies.     25
Sacerdote (2001) finds that grades are higher when students have unusually academically 
strong roommates.  Zimmerman (1999, 2001) finds that weak peers might reduce the 
grades of middling or strong students.  Stinebrickner finds that peer ACT scores are 
insignificant after controlling for roommate family income, which is significant.  
Goethals finds that homogeneity per se matters – students perform better when grouped 
with others of like ability.   
 
X.  Conclusion and Agenda 
 
  Evidence on peer effects in higher education now exists at the most basic level for 
six colleges and universities – covering some 12,000 students – with interactions 
measured for randomly assigned roommates and participants in psych lab experiments.  It 
seems clear that peer effects exist – that students’ characteristics and behavior do, indeed, 
influence other students’ behavior with conventionally measured academic characteristics 
(like SAT) influencing conventionally measured academic performance (like GPA).  
New evidence presented in this chapter adds to our confidence that peer effects exist and 
that the signs of those effects are in the direction that would motivate institutional 
selectivity – strong students tend to increase peers’ academic performance and weak 
students tend to reduce it.  Combined with a sharply skewed distribution of resources 
across colleges, the broad question, “Can peer effects in educational production help 
explain the unusual economic structure and behavior of higher education?” is answered,    26
“Yes.”  The models, of Winston (1999) and Epple-Romano-Sieg (2001)  -- data-driven 
and formally derived respectively -- fit both the data and the peer effect evidence.
30   
 
  But beyond that key question, the facts become less clear and the agenda for 
investigation of peer effects becomes larger.  So there are often different results by 
gender, as in Hoxby’s K-12 results (2000), even in these data that rest on individual 
interactions rather than on those between groups.  On non-linearities – whether peer 
influences operate equally and symmetrically across characteristics and behaviors – the 
evidence is puzzling with homogeneous groupings – strong or weak – sometimes 
performing significantly better than those with peers of different abilities.  Students of 
middling ability are usually more susceptible to peer influence than those at either end of 
the ability distribution (keeping in mind that the student populations reported on here 
represent very narrow ability ranges).  And since our data are based on pairwise 
interactions, a similar analysis might well be extended to those interactions that are 
electronically mediated to see if a “distance learning” environment generates any 
evidence of peer effects. 
 
  The range of peer characteristics and behaviors should be extended, too, wherever 
possible.  The work reported here sticks, by and large, to the most measurable and 
obvious aspects of education – grade performance and academic ability – with occasional 
departure into fraternity membership, family income, and dropout behavior.  But while 
                                                 
30  Note that there’s no evidence of a “teaching effect” in which strong students gain from association with 
weaker students whom they can teach (as implied by Zajonc’s analysis of older siblings (1976)) nor is there 
strong evidence of an “intimidation effect,” though that might help explain Goethals’ finding that weak 
students do better when grouped with other weak students.     27
these are clearly the right place to start, they capture a small part of the behaviors 
influenced by higher education and of interest to colleges in their selection of student 
peer quality – it may be possible to get closer to our “ideal data” with other measurable 
academic behaviors among randomly associated peers.  Like Heckman (1999), Bowles, 
Gintis and Osborn (2001) point out that a small part of the variance in wages attributable 
to education is explained by the cognitive skills we measure with tests and GPAs – the 
rest is attributable to behaviors learned before, after, in, and outside of school that may 
escape cognitive measurement but influence job performance, nonetheless, like 
reliability, attitude, discipline, fatalism, impatience, etc.  To the extent that these 
characteristics and behaviors can be identified and measured, they need to be included in 
studies of peer effects in higher education.
31   
 
  So we conclude that evidence on the existence of peer effects in higher education 
is strong, consistent with an understanding of its economic structure – selectivity, skewed 
resources, and the resulting stratification – that relies on them, but that there remains a 
rich set of questions on how and how broadly peer effects operate among students in 
colleges
32 and especially on the shape of the non-linearities that would help us evaluate 
that structure.   
                                                 
31  On the basis of evidence that a student’s impatience (his time-discount behavior) influences his own 
academic performance (students with lower discount rates get better grades, holding SATs constant (Kirby, 
Winston et al. 2002)), we tried, in a very small sample, to find evidence of peer influence such that one 
roommate’s discount rate affected the other’s academic performance.  But while the sign of the relationship 
was right, it was decidedly insignificant. 




per Student Cost Tuition
All Colleges and Universities $8,423 $12,413 $3,989
Public $8,590 $9,896 $1,305
Private $8,253 $14,986 $6,734
Schools ranked by
Student Subsidies:
Decile 1 $20,991 $27,054 $6,063
Decile 2 $11,865 $15,801 $3,936
Decile 3 $10,009 $13,310 $3,301
Decile 4 $8,752 $11,831 $3,080
Decile 5 $7,855 $10,565 $2,710
Decile 6 $7,020 $9,820 $2,799
Decile 7 $6,250 $9,464 $3,214
Decile 8 $5,447 $8,848 $3,401
Decile 9 $4,262 $9,297 $5,035
Decile 10 $1,736 $8,084 $6,348
Source:  Based on US Department of Education IPEDS data. Includes 2791 institutions, of which 1411 are 
public and 1380 are private. All dollar amounts are per FTE student averaged over institutions. See Winston (2000) and 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics 
School #1  Mean   Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Sample Size  1863  0  1863  1863 
        
Own SAT Score – Verbal  714  66  420  800 
Own SAT Score – Math  695  69  480  800 
Own SAT Score – Combined  1409  112  1090  1600 
Black .079  .270  0  1 
Hispanic .052  .223  0  1 
Native American  .004  .069  0  1 
Asian .151  .358  0  1 
Not a Citizen of the United States  .03  .169  0  1 
Female .432  .495  0  1 
School #2  .430  .494  0  1 
Sample Size  2116  0  2116  2116 
        
Own SAT Score – Verbal  668  68  360  800 
Own SAT Score – Math  676  68  450  800 
Own SAT Score – Combined  1344  110  950  1600 
Black .086  .282  0  1 
Hispanic .044  .206  0  1 
Native American  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Asian .160  .367  0  1 
Not a Citizen of the United States  .095  .292  0  1 
Female .430  .494  0  1 
School #3  Mean   Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Sample Size  1458  0  1458  1458 
        
Own SAT Score – Verbal  687  61  450  800 
Own SAT Score – Math  681  68  420  800 
Own SAT Score – Combined  1368  106  880  1600 
Black .072  .258  0  1 
Hispanic .022  .148  0  1 
Native American  .001  .036  0  1 
Asian .079  .270  0  1 
Not a Citizen of the United States  .03  .148  0  1 
Female .466  .499  0  1 
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Table 3:  Your Grades and Your Roommate’s SAT Scores 
 





























Not a Citizen of the United States  N/A  -.047 
(.065) 
N/A 












Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 
     






Sample  Size  1863 2116 1458 
R- Squared  .303  0.215  0.2475 
Note: Standard Errors are corrected for correlation within roommate cluster. 
Bolded peer and own SAT coefficients are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4:  Your Grades and Your Roommate’s SAT Scores by SAT Group –  
School #1 (Dependent Variable is Cumulative GPA) 
 
 Combined  SAT 
Score (lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle 70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
A.  Linearity in Roommates Scores       






























Not a Citizen of the United States  N/A  N/A  N/A 












Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 
      






Sample Size  269  1281  313 
R- Squared  . 0.288  0.295  0.154 
 Combined  SAT 
Score (lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
B.  Non-linearity in Roommates Scores        






























Not a Citizen of the United States  N/A  N/A  N/A 












Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 
      












Sample  Size  269  1281  313 
R- Squared  0.295  0.295  0.154 
Note: Standard Errors are corrected for correlation within roommate cluster.  Bolded peer 
and own SAT coefficients are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5:  Your Grades and Your Roommate’s SAT Scores by SAT Group and 
Gender – School #1 (Dependent Variable is Cumulative GPA) 
 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
A.  Men       




























Not a Citizen of the United States  N/A  N/A  N/A 






Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 












Sample  Size  137  739  187 
R- Squared  0.637  0.323  0.309 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
B.  Women       






























Not a Citizen of the United States  N/A  N/A  N/A 






Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 












Sample  Size  132  543  128 
R- Squared  0.279  0.325  0.441 
Note: Standard Errors are corrected for correlation within roommate cluster. 
Bolded peer and own SAT coefficients are significant at the 10% level.    33
Table 6:  Your Grades and Your Roommate’s SAT Scores by SAT Group –   
School #2 (Dependent Variable is Cumulative GPA) 
 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
      
A.  Linearity in Roommates Scores       
























Native American  N/A  N/A  N/A 


















Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 
      






Sample Size  280  1500  336 
R- Squared  0.286  0.181  0.178 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
B.  Non-linearity in Roommates Scores        
























Native American  N/A  N/A  N/A 


















Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 
      












Sample  Size  282  1505  337 
R- Squared  0.286  0.181  0.172 
Note: Standard Errors are corrected for correlation within roommate cluster. 
Bolded peer and own SAT coefficients are significant at the 10% level. 
    34
 
Table 7:  Your Grades and Your Roommate’s SAT Scores by SAT Group and 
Gender – School #2 (Dependent Variable is Cumulative GPA) 
 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
A.  Men       
























Native American  N/A  N/A  N/A 












Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 












Sample  Size  110  839  245 
R- Squared  0.258  0.209  0.238 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
B.  Women       
























Native American  N/A  N/A  N/A 












Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 












Sample  Size  172  666  92 
R- Squared  0.439  0.204  0.209 
Note: Standard Errors are corrected for correlation within roommate cluster. 
Bolded peer and own SAT coefficients are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 8:  Your Grades and Your Roommate’s SAT Scores by SAT Group –   
School #3 (Dependent Variable is Cumulative GPA) 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
      
A.  Linearity in Roommates Scores       
























Native American  (dropped)  .120 
(.087) 
(dropped) 
Not a Citizen of the United States  N/A  N/A  N/A 












Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 
      






Sample Size  221  975  262 
R- Squared  0.3560  (0.1151)  0.1215 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
B.  Non-linearity in Roommates Scores        
























Native American  (dropped)  .110 
(.085) 
(dropped) 
Not a Citizen of the United States  N/A  N/A  N/A 












Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 
      












Sample  Size  223  981  263 
R- Squared  0.3585  0.1173  0.1377 
Note: Standard Errors are corrected for correlation within roommate cluster. 
Bolded peer and own SAT coefficients are significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 9:  Your Grades and Your Roommate’s SAT Scores by SAT Group and 
Gender – School #3 (Dependent Variable is Cumulative GPA) 
 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
A.  Men       
























Native American  (dropped)  .043 
(.088) 
(dropped) 
Not a Citizen of the United States  N/A  N/A  N/A 






Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 












Sample  Size  104  464  204 
R- Squared  0.4625  0.1634  0.1396 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
B.  Women       
























Native American  (dropped)  (dropped)  (dropped) 
Not a Citizen of the United States  N/A  N/A  N/A 






Major Dummy Variables   YES  YES  YES 












Sample  Size  119  517  59 
R- Squared  0.4546  0.1172  0.6660 
Note: Standard Errors are corrected for correlation within roommate cluster. 
Shaded peer and own SAT coefficients are significant at the 10% level.    37
Table 10:  Peer Coefficients from Stacked Data for All Three Schools 
(Dependent Variable is Cumulative GPA) 
 
  Combined SAT Score 
(lowest 15%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(middle  70%) 
Combined SAT Score 
(top 15%) 
A.  Men and Women       












      
B.  Men       












      
C.  Women       












Note:  Bolded peer SAT coefficients are significant at the 10% level.  Other controls are 
own SAT scores, gender, ethnicity, major, and school fixed effect. 
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Table 11 :  Recent Studies of Academic Peer Effects 
Academic Peer Effects 







SAT  in bottom 15% 
-.077 
(.027) 
Impact on middle 70% of SAT 






SAT  in bottom 15% 
-.086 
(.034) 
Impact on middle 70% of SAT 
distribution, three schools from 
College and Beyond. 
Sacerdote 
(2001) 
Roommate in top 




Dartmouth.  Controls for housing 
questions.  Also peer effect on 






ACT score  .001 
(.004) 
 
Controls for roommate’s family 
income.  Roommate income is 
significant with grades, rising .052 





N/A  Finds performance increases with 
group homogeneity in academic 
rating. 
* Taken from Table 4 in Zimmerman (1999), Table 3 in Sacerdote (2000), Table 3 in 
Stinebrickner (2000) and Tables 5 to 10 above.   
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